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Commercial aviation and commercial space similarly launch, fly, and land passenger
vehicles. Unlike aviation, the U.S. government has not established maintenance policies
for commercial space. This study conducted a mixed methods review of 610 U.S. space
launches from 1984 through 2011, which included 31 failures. An analysis of the failure
causal factors showed that human error accounted for 76% of those failures, which
included workmanship error accounting for 29% of the failures. With the imminent
future of commercial space travel, the increased potential for the loss of human life
demands that changes be made to the standardized procedures, training, and certification
to reduce human error and failure rates. Several recommendations were made by this
study to the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation, space launch vehicle
operators, and maintenance technician schools in an effort to increase the safety of the
space transportation passengers.
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Chapter I
Introduction
“Next to wars, nuclear reactor accidents, major transportation accidents, and
natural disasters, a space launch failure is one of the most expensive losses in the national
resources for a nation in pursuit of technological advancement” (Chang, 1996, p. 198).
Regardless of whether the launch failure was due to component failure or human error,
the failure wasted vital national resources and negatively affected the country’s image
within the scientific world. Often, these failures were a result of non-standard
maintenance practices, which have been attributed to the lack of training and certification
requirements for the maintenance technicians (Chang, 1996).
From 1957 through 2011, the world attempted 6,498 space launches, but only
5,880 of those attempts were successful, bringing the success rate to 90.4 percent. Of the
618 failures, U.S. launches accounted for 168 of the failures. Having a 90.4 percent
average success rate is not terribly low except when the cost of failure is considered. For
example, a small launch vehicle has a value of about $15 million, while a larger more
versatile launch vehicle has a value of over a billion dollars. In addition, a small satellite
may be valued at a million dollars, but an advanced satellite is valued at more than a
billion dollars. When the financial implications of a small launch vehicle carrying a
small satellite, with a combined minimum value of $16 million, are considered, a failure
rate of even one percent is unacceptable. The $16 million value only accounts for the
loss of the vehicle and the satellite and does not account for the expenses associated with
the recovery and cleanup after a launch failure (Chang, 2000).
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April 28, 2001 marked the beginning of commercial space travel when Dennis
Tito paid to travel into space aboard the Russian Soyuz TM-32 (Wall, 2011a). Several
other individuals have paid to travel to space since 2001 (Wall, 2011b). Although all
commercial space travel has only happened in foreign markets through 2011, the United
States has been quickly advancing towards commercial space travel. Several nongovernment agencies, such as SpaceX and Boeing, have already conducted successful
space launches. The advancement toward commercial space travel creates an increased
risk for the potential loss of human life in space launch accidents (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2008).
In U.S. commercial aviation, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires
an FAA certificated inspector to inspect and signoff every maintenance action on an
aircraft (Federal Aviation Administration Maintenance, Preventative Maintenance,
Rebuilding, and Alteration, 1962). The strict regulations on aircraft maintenance are an
effort to reduce maintenance errors and therefore, the potential for aircraft accidents,
bodily harm, and/or loss of life. Many Aviation Maintenance Technician Schools around
the country have developed specific courses of study to train and certify maintainers to
meet the FAA regulation criteria (Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Maintenance
Technician Schools, 1962).
Significance of the Study
This study provided useful technical information about space-system technician
training and procedures to the FAA’s Office of Commercial Space Transportation, space
launch vehicle operators, and space transportation passengers. The safety of human life,
with regard to space travel, was the true goal of this study.
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The Department of Transportation (DOT) governs the safety of commercial travel
throughout the United States (Department of Transportation Purpose, 2010). The
information contained in this study will aid the Office of Commercial Space
Transportation to make decisions on the rules and regulations pertaining to the
maintenance of space launch systems.
Space launch system operators can use the information contained in this study to
enhance the maintenance procedures on their space launch systems; thereby, decreasing
maintenance errors and resultant failures. Space launch system operators could save
money that might have been lost due to a launch failure. The expenditures that could be
saved include, but are not limited to, costs of the vehicle; repair/replacement of property
damage; medical and insurance costs for bodily harm; and/or insurance costs for loss of
life.
Ultimately, this study aimed to enhance the safety of the passengers traveling via
commercial space-systems. People who intend on travelling into space rely on the
knowledge, skills, training, and infallibility of the people who design, build, and maintain
commercial transportation systems to keep the vehicles and passengers safe.
Statement of the Problem
Although catastrophic, past launch failures have not resulted in the loss of civilian
life. The one exception is Christa McAuliffe, who was among the crew of the Space
Shuttle Challenger when it failed. The imminent future of commercial space travel
creates an increased potential for the loss of civilian life, and passenger safety must be
taken into account. Every effort must be made to reduce launch failures. The human
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error rates in space-system maintenance must be reduced. It is essential that the industry
recognize a need for specific space-system maintenance safety regulations.
The Guide to Commercial Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Operations and
Maintenance (Federal Aviation Administration, 2005) contains the requirements for
space launch vehicle maintenance. Each of the guidelines for RLV maintenance utilizes
the action word “should” as the requirement. The guide does not define standard
maintenance action procedures, specific training levels, minimum experience
requirement, or license requirements that should be mandatory for RLV maintenance
personnel.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was to evaluate space transportation failures to
determine whether a significant proportion of the failures were attributable to human
error by maintenance technicians and, therefore, could be mitigated through standardized
procedures, training, and certification. The secondary purpose of this study was to
evaluate the minimum requirements for space-system technicians by space-system
operators in order to develop a space-systems technician course curriculum.
Hypotheses
Four hypotheses were tested in this study. The null hypotheses were:


It was hypothesized that there was no significant relationship between spacesystem technician/engineer workmanship error and rocket launch outcome.



It was hypothesized that there was no significant relationship between spacesystem design error and rocket launch outcome.

5


It was hypothesized that there was no significant relationship between spacesystem process error and rocket launch outcome.



It was hypothesized that there was no significant relationship between spacesystem component failure and rocket launch outcome.

Two research questions were also analyzed in this study. They were:


Did space industry companies use standardized maintenance procedures?



Was there a need for standardized FAA mandated maintenance procedures,
training, and certification?

Delimitations
The scope of this study covered only the U.S. space launches from 1984 to 2011,
due to time constraints. The design of the study evaluated rules and regulations set by the
Federal Aviation Administration, as they pertained to space-system operations conducted
in the United States.
Limitations and Assumptions
This study was limited to information that was available to the public. The U.S.
military has conducted many secret space launches. Due to national security, the
military’s launch and result data were secret and were not available to this researcher.
This researcher conducted the study with the belief that there should be
regulations that require standardized maintenance procedures, training, and certifications
for space-system technicians. The researcher believed that safety was the main concern
of public transportation and that regulating space technician procedures, training, and
certification would aid in mitigating the possibility of a space launch failure due to
technician error.
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Definition of Terms
A&P License

A three-part rating, General, Airframe, and/or Powerplant,
for which a certificated mechanic may have one, two, or all
three ratings. A certificated aircraft mechanic may obtain
an Airframe and/or Powerplant (A&P) rating through the
FAA. Therefore, the mechanic can inspect and signoff
maintenance actions for which they are rated (Federal
Aviation Administration Certification: Airmen Other Than
Flight Crewmembers, 1962).

Airman Certificate

The certificate issued by the Federal Aviation
Administration authorizing a person to perform certain
aviation-related duties. Airman certificates are issued to
pilots, mechanics, and parachute riggers (Crane, 2006).

lbf

The symbol lbf is used in science to distinguish the pound
of force from the pound of mass (lbm) (Rowlett, 2004).

lbm

The symbol lbm is used in science to distinguish the pound
of mass from the pound of force (lbf) (Rowlett, 2004).

List of Acronyms
A&P

Airframe and Powerplant

AABI

Aviation Accreditation Board International

ACE

American Council on Education

AMS

Aviation Maintenance Science

AMT

Aviation Maintenance Technology
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ASAT

Associate of Science in Aerospace Technology

AWIN

Aviation Week Intelligence Network

BCC

Brevard Community College

BSAT

Bachelor of Science in Aerospace Technology

CCC

Calhoun Community College

CHEA

Council for Higher Education Accreditation

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

DOD

Department of Defense

DOT

Department of Transportation

ELV

Expendable Launch Vehicle

ERAU

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

GPIB

General Purpose Interface Bus

IRB

Institutional Review Board

LEO

Low Earth Orbit

LRE

Liquid Rocket Engines

MEDA

Maintenance Error Decision Aid

MLV

Medium Launch Vehicle

NACA

National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics

NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NCACS

North Central Association of Colleges and Schools

OSHA

Occupational Safety and Health Administration

RLV

Reusable Launch Vehicle
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S&P

Spacecraft and Propulsion

SACS

Southern Association of Colleges and Schools

SMT

Space-system Maintenance Technology

STAR

Space Transportation Analysis and Research

STS

Space Transportation System

WAD

World Access Database

WMU

Western Michigan University
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Chapter II
Review of the Relevant Literature
The world of commercial space transportation is not much different from
commercial aviation. Both commercial aviation and commercial space transportation
require a passenger vehicle to leave the ground, fly, and land.
Lifecycle of a Project
Every project, including building an airplane or a space system, goes through a
life cycle that consists of several phases from concept through termination (Cleland &
King, 1975). Shtub, Bard, and Globerson (1994) described five phases in the project life
cycle with a sixth possible phase. The six phases were Conceptual Design, Advanced
Development, Detailed Design, Production, Termination, and Operation. If the operation
phase was included in the life cycle, Shtub et al. (1994) indicated that it could come
before, coincide with, or occur after the termination phase.
Shtub et al. (1994) stated that during the production phase “the focus is on actual
performance and changes in the original plans” (p. 26). They further stated that when an
operational phase was scheduled, preparations for personnel training and maintenance
procedures required management’s attention during the production phase (Shtub et al.,
1994).
In the lifecycle of a project, from the concept stage through the production phase,
engineers normally performed all of the assembly, maintenance, and repair of the project.
Once the project entered the operational phase, the responsibility for performing
assembly, maintenance, and repair switched to maintenance technicians.
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Aviation Maintenance History
During the early years of aviation maintenance, “mechanics were often unlicensed
test pilots” (Koontz, 2011, p. vii). The importance of Federal intervention concerning
licensure was stressed as early as 1912 by a leading aviation journal called Aeronautics.
The U.S. Government was slow to take responsibility for air commerce and establish
regulations for civil aeronautics. In 1919, the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics (NACA) began a campaign for Federal legislation of aeronautics, which
included licensure of pilots and maintainers (Briddon, Champie, & Marraine, 1974).
On May 20, 1926, the Air Commerce Act of 1926 was signed into law, which
established the Air Regulations Division under the Aeronautics Branch of the Department
of Commerce. The first regulations written by the Air Regulations Division went into
effect December 31, 1926. One of the regulations required all maintenance personnel of
commercial aircraft to secure a license for engine maintenance, airplane maintenance, or
both by March 1, 1927. The provision allowed maintenance personnel who had
submitted their applications within the specified time to continue to operate until July 1,
1927 (Briddon et al., 1974). The Aeronautics Branch issued Mechanic License No. 1
(Airplane & Engine) on July 1, 1927, to Frank Gates Gardner (Koontz, 2011).
Aviation Maintenance Signoff Requirements
Title 14, Aeronautics and Space, Part 43 of the Code of Federal Regulations
(CFR) contains the rules and regulations pertaining to aircraft maintenance, preventative
maintenance, rebuilding, and alteration (Federal Aviation Administration Maintenance,
Preventative Maintenance, Rebuilding, and Alteration, 1962). Subpart 43.3 covers
specifically who may or may not work on aircraft. Although certain specific instances
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allow some degree of deviation, the regulation states that only those individuals with a
certificate issued by the FAA or those under direct supervision of an FAA certificated
individual may perform aircraft maintenance. Subpart 43.9a states that maintainers shall
record every maintenance action. Maintenance records must include the name of the
person performing the maintenance; a description of the work performed; the date; and
the name, signature, certificate number, and type of certificate held by the person
approving the work (Federal Aviation Administration Maintenance, Preventative
Maintenance, Rebuilding, and Alteration, 1962).
The FAA did make a stipulation for experimental aircraft. Under the Application
paragraph of Part 43, the regulation states that Part 43 does not apply to aircraft for which
the FAA has issued an experimental certificate, unless the FAA has previously issued
another type of certificate (Federal Aviation Administration Maintenance, Preventative
Maintenance, Rebuilding, and Alteration, 1962).
Training and certification. Title 14, Aeronautics and Space, Part 65 of the CFR
contains the certification requirements for aviation maintenance technicians desiring to
obtain a General Mechanic Certificate (Federal Aviation Administration Certification:
Airmen Other Than Flight Crewmembers, 1962). Subparts 65.75, 65.77, and 65.79
specify the knowledge, experience, and skills required before an individual is eligible to
be certificated with additional ratings such as Airframe certificated, Powerplant
certificated, or both Airframe and Powerplant (A&P) certificated. Subpart 65.80 grants
authorization to aviation maintenance technician schools, which have been certificated
under Part 147, to allow students who make satisfactory progress to take the A&P
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certification exams (Federal Aviation Administration Certification: Airmen Other Than
Flight Crewmembers, 1962).
Aviation colleges. Title 14, Aeronautics and Space, Part 147 of the CFR contains
the rules and regulations for aviation maintenance schools to be certificated to train and
test aviation maintenance technicians for General Mechanic Certificate, Airframe
Certificate, and/or Powerplant Certificate (Federal Aviation Administration Aviation
Maintenance Technician Schools, 1962). As of December 5, 2011, only 166 aviation
maintenance technician schools were certificated under Part 147 (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2011). Of those 166 schools, only Embry-Riddle Aeronautical
University (ERAU) and Western Michigan University (WMU) were regionally
accredited and had their aviation maintenance programs accredited by Aviation
Accreditation Board International (AABI) (Aviation Accreditation Board International,
2012).
The Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS) regionally accredits
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. ERAU offers two aviation maintenance
programs: Associate of Science in Aviation Maintenance Science (AMS) and Bachelor of
Science in AMS. Both degree programs meet the FAA requirements (Embry-Riddle
Aeronautical University, 2011). Both programs are Part 147 certificated by the FAA
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2011) and both programs are AABI accredited
(Aviation Accreditation Board International, 2012).
The North Central Association of Colleges and Schools (NCACS) regionally
accredits Western Michigan University. WMU offers a Bachelor of Science in Aviation
Maintenance Technology (AMT). The program meets the FAA requirements (Western
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Michigan University, 2012). The WMU AMT program is Part 147 certificated by the
FAA (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011) and is AABI accredited (Aviation
Accreditation Board International, 2012).
Accreditation
The definition of accredit is “to recognize (an educational institution) as
maintaining standards that qualify the graduates for admission to higher or more
specialized institutions or for professional practice” (Accreditation, n.d.). In the United
States, the American Council on Education (ACE) formed in 1918. By 2012, ACE
represented the interests of more than 1,600 presidents and chancellors of all types of
U.S. accredited degree-granting institutions (American Council on Education, 2012).
ACE supports the Council for Higher Education Accreditation (CHEA), which
recognizes the agencies that accredit institutions and programs in the U.S. CHEA
recognizes 61 programmatic accrediting organizations and 19 institutional accrediting
organizations. CHEA recognizes NCACS and SACS as institutional accrediting
organizations. CHEA recognizes AABI as a programmatic accrediting organization
(Eaton, 2002; Eaton, 2011).
Space Launch Vehicle History
Looking back at the wars of the world, dominance relied heavily on offensive
capabilities. One of those dominant offensive capabilities was the use of rockets as
weapons. The origins of rocketry trace back to the early 13th century when the Chinese
used a mixture of gunpowder to launch solid rockets, called “fire arrows,” (Chang, 2000,
p. 853) at invaders. Over hundreds of years, the fire arrows advanced into bombcarrying, solid propellant rockets used during World War I. As World War I developed,
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the first missiles were tested and used for offensive measures. By World War II, basic
missiles had developed into ballistic missiles powered by liquid propellant. During the
years of the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1991,
rocket technology advanced dramatically, but at great expense, due to the undying desire
of both countries to be the first country in space (Chang, 2000).
As past advancements helped to create current military technologies, those
advancements have also allowed aerospace engineers to develop space systems to launch
satellites of all varieties and complexities into space for many different purposes (Chang,
2000). In the period between 1957 and 1998, multiple countries had sought to lead the
world in space studies through their own advances; the United States and the
Commonwealth of Independent States/Soviet Union have managed to stay at the
forefront of the world’s space launch abilities. The world’s first satellite (Sputnik 1) was
launched by the Soviet Union in 1957 and weighed only 184.3 lbm. The Commonwealth
of Independent States/Soviet Union had produced the most reliable expendable launch
vehicle (ELV) in the world, called the Soyuz and remained the world leader in satellite
launches until its dissolution in 1991.
Advances in technology allowed the US to launch the Saturn V, which carried the
139,369 lbm Apollo 11 to the moon in 1969. By the 1980s, the US was routinely
launching the Space Shuttle. The Space Shuttle was capable of launching cargo weighing
more than 49,000 lbs into low earth orbit (LEO) and was considered the first reusable
space transportation system (STS). It launched as a rocket, performed as a spacecraft
while in orbit, then landed as a glider upon return. As of July 21, 2011, the era of the
routinely launched U.S. Space Shuttle Orbiter ended (Wade, 2012).
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Space Launch Vehicle Reliability
In his article, Investigation of Space Launch Vehicle Catastrophic Failures,
Chang (1996) reviewed worldwide space launch failures from January 1, 1984, through
December 31, 1994. During that eleven-year period, 43 failures occurred worldwide. Of
those 43 failures, 14 failures occurred in the United States. Table 1 shows the U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD) and non-DOD space launch vehicle success-failure record
from 1984 to 1994.

Table 1
List of DOD and Non-DOD U.S. Space Launches from 1984 to 1994
U.S. DODª
U.S. non-DOD
U.S. Total
Year
Success
Failure
Success
Failure
Success
Failure
1984
12
0
9
1
21
1
1985
6
1
11
0
17
1
1986
4
1
2
2
6
3
1987
5
1
3
0
8
1
1988
6
1
5
0
11
1
1989
16
0
2
0
18
0
1990
14
0
12
1
26
1
1991
10
0
7
2
17
2
1992
12
0
15
1
27
1
1993
12
1
11
1
23
2
1994
8
0
18
1
26
1
Total
105
5
95
9
200
14
Success rate,
95.5
91.3
93.5
%
Note. Adapted from “Investigation of Space Launch Vehicle Catastrophic Failures,” by
I. -S. Chang, 1996, Journal of Spacecraft and Propulsion, p. 199. Copyright 1996 by
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics.
ªIncludes all DOD-involved government space launches.

In September/October 2010, Tomei and Chang presented success/failure data to
the 61st International Astronautical Congress on the U.S. Medium Launch Vehicle (MLV)
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History. “MLVs from 1958 to 2010 had an overall success rate of 90% with 929
successes and 103 failures” (p. 2). Tomei and Chang (2010) further broke down the
failures into root failures and stated that “workmanship” (p. 3) was attributed to 22.3% of
the MLV failures.
Space-systems Technician Training and Certification
The FAA stated in the report Support Services for Commercial Space Travel
(2008), “Training of technical personnel to support the space transportation industry has
occurred primarily by the space transportation companies themselves” (p. 9).
Additionally the FAA (2008) stated, “No national certification similar to what the FAA
offers for aircraft maintenance personnel existed until recently” (p. 9). The report then
went on to identify SpaceTEC® as the organizing force in space maintenance technician
certification (Federal Aviation Administration, 2008).
Aerospace technician certification. SpaceTEC® (2011a) at Kennedy Space
Center in Florida states that they “provide the only national performance-based
certifications for aerospace technicians in the United States today” (p. 1). The
certification offered by SpaceTEC® is similar to the FAA’s A&P certification process.
Technicians may obtain their certification in two categories:
1. A core certification for entry-level employees covering general knowledge in
six areas: Introduction to Aerospace; Applied Mechanics; Basic Electricity;
Test and Measurement; Materials and Process; and Aerospace Safety; or
2. A concentration certification for advanced standing in one of the following
three areas: Aerospace Vehicle Processing, Aerospace Manufacturing, or
Aerospace Composites. (SpaceTEC®, 2011b, p. 1)
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Technicians must have met one of four prerequisites before they may sit for the
core exam. The technicians must:
1. Have a two-year technical college program degree, or
2. Have completed at least a two-year technical military assignment, or
3. Have held a valid current FAA A&P certificate, or
4. Have had two or more years of on-the-job training and experience in the
Aerospace industry. (SpaceTEC®, 2011b, p. 1)
Once any one of the prerequisites is satisfied, the technician obtains their Core
Certification by successfully completing a three-part test consisting of: a written
computer-based examination, an oral examination, and a practical performance-based
skills examination. Core certificated technicians may obtain further certification in any
of the three concentration areas by successfully completing the three-part test for each
concentration certification desired.
Brevard Community College (BCC), in Brevard County, Florida, offers an
Associate of Science in Aerospace Technology (ASAT) degree. “This program prepares
students for employment as aerospace technicians” (Brevard Community College, 2011,
p. 62). BCC also offers several courses, which resulted in certificates from SpaceTEC®
(Brevard Community College, 2011).
Calhoun Community College (CCC), in Alabama, also offers an Associate of
Science in Aerospace Technology (ASAT) degree (Calhoun Community College, 2011).
“CCC is a member institution of SpaceTEC®, a national community college consortium
funded by a National Science Foundation grant” (Calhoun Community College, 2011,
p. 1).
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Human Error
Human error is strongly associated with technology. Human error refers to the
reliability of humans in fields including manufacturing and transportation. Human error
has long been the number one causal factor in most aviation accidents (Dhillon & Liu,
2006). Reliability is defined by Dhillon (2009) as “the probability that an item (or
human) will perform its specified function adequately for the desired period when used
according to the stated conditions” (p. 5). The association of human error and accidents
has many forms from design errors to process errors to workmanship errors.
Workmanship is defined as “the art or skill of a workman, also: the quality imparted to a
thing in the process of making” (Workmanship, n.d.).
In a study of utility companies around the U.S., Varma (1996) found that human
error related failures were involved in 27 percent of all plant outages from 1990-1994. In
one of the utilities studied, the number of human error-related failures was two and a half
times greater than hardware related failures. After the utility companies instituted
intensive training programs, the human error related failures dropped by more than 50%
(Varma, 1996). In a study conducted by Boeing, 19.1% of in-flight engine shutdowns
were caused by maintenance errors (Marx, 1998). Marx (1998) further stated that
maintenance error was a causal factor in 15% of all air carrier accidents, which cost the
U.S. aviation industry over 1 billion dollars annually.
Several aviation companies have developed programs in an effort to reduce the
number of maintenance errors. Boeing has implemented a program called Maintenance
Error Decision Aid (MEDA). MEDA was a structured process for investigating the
causes of human errors made by aircraft maintenance personnel (Hibit & Marx, 1994).
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Under these programs, one of the main areas of concentration was maintenance training.
To reduce maintenance error, Dhillon (2009) recommended two guidelines: “to provide,
on a periodic basis, training courses to all maintenance personnel with emphasis on
company procedures” (p. 107) and “consider introducing crew resourcement for
personnel involved with the maintenance activity” (p. 107).
Summary
Every project, including designing an airplane or a space-system, goes through
several stages in its lifecycle from concept to operation. During the experimental stage of
developing a system, project managers must realize the importance of developing a
system to carry the airplane into operation. In the operational stage, engineers/designers
are no longer the ones assembling, maintaining, and/or repairing the aircraft, and
maintenance technicians take over those responsibilities. The system should include the
requirements to train and certify the technicians and the requirements for standardized
maintenance procedures (Shtub et al., 1994).
The aviation industry has followed the life cycle of a project. During the
experimental stage, in 1926, the Air Commerce Act was signed into law, which laid the
framework for regulating aircraft maintainers (Briddon et al., 1974). The regulations
evolved over the years to include requirements for how to document maintenance
performed on the aircraft, who can work on the aircraft, who can sign-off the
maintenance performed on the aircraft, and the requirements for training and certifying
those individuals (Federal Aviation Administration Maintenance, Preventative
Maintenance, Rebuilding, and Alteration, 1962). Individuals desiring to work on aircraft
can, once they meet the prerequisites, take the tests and earn the Airman’s Certificate, as
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well as obtain their A&P ratings (Federal Aviation Administration Certification: Airmen
Other Than Flight Crewmembers, 1962).
Several colleges and universities around the country have developed training
programs, which meet the FAA requirements for certifying maintenance professionals
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2011). Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and
Western Michigan University have led the nation by having their maintenance programs
individually accredited, in addition to their institutions’ regional accreditation (Aviation
Accreditation Board International, 2012).
With the advent of rocketry in 1957, space travel began its lifecycle (Chang,
2000). As of 2011, commercial space travel has only happened in Russia and has not
made it into the United States (Wall, 2011b). The U.S. commercial space-systems of
2011 are still in the experimental stage (Wall, 2011b), which is the stage when managers
should begin developing standardized maintenance procedures, training, and certification
programs (Shtub et al., 1994).
BCC and CCC have developed space-system maintenance training programs,
which allow their students to become core certified in space-system maintenance by the
non-government agency SpaceTEC® (Brevard Community College, 2011; Calhoun
Community College, 2011). The SpaceTEC® certification is similar to earning an A&P
license for aircraft, except that the certification is for individuals to perform maintenance
on space-systems (SpaceTEC®, 2011). As of 2011, the FAA has not mandated the
certification developed by SpaceTEC® (Federal Aviation Administration, Office of
Commercial Space Transportation, 2011).
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Human error has long been known as a main causal factor for incidents in
industry. Aviation and space travel are not exempt from that association (Dhillon & Liu,
2006). In an effort to reduce human error in aviation, several programs have been
developed throughout the years, including MEDA by Boeing (Hibit & Marx, 1994). Two
of the key contributing factors to human error in maintenance are the lack of training and
the use of nonstandard procedures. The development of periodic training and
standardized maintenance are highly recommended avenues for mitigating human error
among maintenance professionals (Dhillon, 2009).
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Chapter III
Methodology
The researcher used mixed-methods to perform this study. A mixed-methods
review of rocket failures was performed and mixed-method survey research was
performed.
Research Approach
The researcher performed a correlation study of space launches to determine if
there was a relationship between engineer/non-engineer technician workmanship error
and the failure of space launches. The researcher also performed a descriptive study of
companies in the space industry to determine if there was a need for standardized training
and/or procedures for the maintenance of space-systems.
Design and procedures. The researcher read publicly available failure reports
and published articles for 1980 through 2011 space launch failures. This literature review
allowed the researcher to develop a matrix of launch vehicle failures and the causal
factors that led to the failures (see Appendix B1).
The researcher designed a mixed-method ten-question survey (see Appendix B2).
The survey was sent electronically to a sample of 90 space industry companies. The
survey was hosted on Surveymonkey.com.
Population/Sample
The population for the rocket failure analysis was all rocket launches in the
United States from 1957 to 2011. The sample was a cluster sample of the 610 United
States launches from 1984 to 2011, which included 31 launch failures (The Tauri Group,
2012).
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The population for the training, certification, and standardized procedures
analysis was all United States space industry companies, which included space
component manufacturers, space-system developers, and space-system operators. The
sample was a convenience sample of 90 space industry companies listed in the World
Access Database (WAD), maintained by Aviation Week Intelligence Network (AWIN).
The respondents were from space component manufacturers, space-system developers,
and space-system operators.
Sources of the Data
The data for launch failures was obtained through publicly available reports,
journal articles, and books read and categorized by the researcher. The list of total
launches and failures was obtained from the STAR database provided by The Tauri
Group (The Tauri Group, 2012).
The data for the descriptive study were obtained through primary research
conducted by the researcher utilizing a survey. The researcher was granted permission by
the ERAU Institutional Review Board (IRB) to conduct the survey and solicit responses
via email (see Appendix A).
Data Collection Device
The launch outcomes were ranked from 0-2. A rank of “0” was assigned for a
successful launch, a rank of “1” was assigned for a partial success, and a rank of “2” was
assigned for a launch failure. The failure launches were categorized into six categories
by the subsystem that failed. The subsystem categories were propulsion, structures,
avionics, separation/staging, electrical, and other. The failures were further broken down
into four causal factor classifications. The causal factor classifications were process
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error, workmanship error, component failure, and design error. The causal factor
classifications were ranked from 0-2. A rank of “0” was assigned if the causal factor
classification was not included as a reason for the launch failure. A rank of “1” was
assigned if the causal factor classification was a contributing factor for the launch failure.
A rank of “2” was assigned if the causal factor classification was the main or primary
cause for the launch failure.
The survey was a mixed-methods design. The questions in the survey were
designed for the following purposes:


Question 1 of the survey was designed to ensure that the subject had read
and fully understood the Informed Consent Form and to ensure that the
subject had received a copy of the Informed Consent Form. By selecting
yes, the subject agreed to the statement and agreed to participate.



Questions 2, 3, and 4 were for categorical purposes. These questions
allowed the researcher to group the responses by field and/or component,
as well as their stage in development.



Questions 5 and 8 were designed to determine the structure of the
company with regard to the engineers and/or technicians that assembled,
maintained, and/or repaired the component or system. These questions
were used in conjunction with Question 4 to explore the relationship
between the stages in lifecycle and the structure of the company.



Questions 6 and 7 were designed to determine the level and type of
training required by space-system manufacturers/operators with regard to
engineers and/or technicians. The responses to these questions allowed
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the researcher to determine the type and level of training that an
organization should include to meet the needs of the space industry. The
responses aided in designing a course curriculum for space-system
maintainers.


Questions 9 and 10 were designed to determine to what degree spacesystem manufacturers and/or operators utilized and/or agreed with
standardized maintenance and sign-off procedures. These questions aided
the researcher in determining the level of safety to which the companies
were committed

Instrument reliability. The research design for categorizing rocket failures
utilized only data obtained from published journal articles, reports from the source, and
published books. Reliability of the data collected relied on the integrity of the authors of
the published literature that was reviewed; multiple sources were used for reliability and
validity purposes.
Reliability of the survey was verified through a check of internal consistency.
Questions 5 and 8 were reviewed and compared to ensure the respondents remained
consistent with respect to their responses to the phase of lifecycle that their products were
in throughout the survey. Any surveys that demonstrated inconsistent responses were
discarded.
Instrument validity. A triangulation method was used to categorize the rocket
failures and classify the causal factors. Two reports for each failure were reviewed to
determine the causal factors and code them. If a discrepancy was noted between the two
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reports, a third report was reviewed and the classification was made with the two
complementary reports.
The survey was pre-tested via a group of the researcher’s peers. A panel of
ERAU faculty members reviewed and made changes to the survey. The revised survey
was sent to the ERAU IRB, which approved the survey for use (see Appendix A).
Treatment of the Data
The researcher utilized the ranks of the causal factors classifications (independent
variable) to conduct an analysis of the launch outcomes (dependent variable) and
determine if a statistically significant relationship existed. The data were analyzed using
Spearman’s rho and were held to a .05 significance level.
Descriptive statistics. The researcher used figures to depict all nominal data
obtained in both sections of the study. Rocket failures resulted in several areas having
categorical data. Frequencies and percentages of rocket launch successes and failures
were depicted in tables.
Hypothesis testing. Because the data were ordinal, the null hypotheses were
tested utilizing a Spearman’s Correlation Coefficient for Ranked Data to calculate the
correlation between each individual causal factor classifications and the launch outcome.
The desired level of significance was α = 0.05.
Qualitative data. The literature review provided qualitative descriptions of the
launches from 1984 through 2011. The researcher read the journal articles, books, and
reports that described the failures, which allowed the researcher to interpret the results
and classify the causes of the failures in the matrix of launch vehicle failures (see
Appendix B1).
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Each question on the survey included a qualitative block in which the respondents
could incorporate any additional information that they felt necessary to support their
selected response. Due to the limited number of respondents willing to participate in the
survey, a statistical analysis of the responses could not be performed, however some
practical answers started to become evident.
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Chapter IV
Results
The total number of non-secret United States space launches from 1984 through
2011 was 610. Of those 610 launches, 31 launches were classified as failures, and four
launches were classified as partial successes.
The response rate for the survey was too low to perform any statistical analysis.
Of the 90 surveys sent out, the researcher received six responses. Two respondents
agreed to participate, and four respondents did not agree to participate.
Descriptive Statistics
A frequencies check of the data through SPSS resulted in a 94.3% success rate, a
0.6% partial success rate, and a 5.1% failure rate. The failures were further broken down
by causal factor. Figure 1 describes the results.

Figure 1. Launch failures broken down by causal factor.
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The launch failures were also broken down by the subsystem that failed. The
results are depicted in Table 2.

Table 2
Launch Failures Broken Down by Subsystem that Failed
Outcome
Failure

Subsystem
Propulsion
Separation
Avionics
Electrical
Other
Total

Frequency
12
10
04
02
03
31

Percent
38.7
32.3
12.9
06.4
09.7
100.0

The subsystem failure frequencies were then categorized by causal factor. The
results are depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Subsystem failures categorized by causal factor.

30
The subsystem failures were categorized into three time spans of 1984 through
1993, 1994 through 2002, and 2003 through 2011. The results are depicted in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Subsystem failures categorized into three periods.

The last set of descriptive statistics was done to break down the failures by launch
organization. Tables 3 through 5 depict the results.

Table 3
Frequency Table for Success/Failure by Launch Organization
Launch Organization
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA)
U.S. Air Force
Non-DOD

Outcome
Success
Failure
Success
Failure
Success
Partial
Failure

Frequency Percent
141
97.9
003
02.1
109
93.2
008
06.8
325
93.1
004
01.1
020
05.7
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Table 4
Launch Failures Broken Down by Launch Organization/Causal Factor
Launch Organization
NASA

U.S. Air Force

Non-DOD

Causal Factor
Frequency Percent
Process Error
1
33.3
Component Failure
1
33.3
2 or More Categories
1
33.3
Process Error
3
37.5
Workmanship Error
3
37.5
2 or More Categories
2
25.0
Workmanship Error
6
30.0
Design Error
7
35.0
Component Failure
7
35.0

Table 5
Launch Failures Broken Down by Launch Organization/Weight Class
Launch
Organization
NASA

U.S. Air
Force

Non-DOD

Rocket
Process WorkmanWeight Class Error
ship Error
Small
Medium
Intermediate
Heavy
1
Small
Medium
1
Intermediate
Heavy
2
3
Small
1
Medium
1
Intermediate
3
Heavy
1

Design
Error

Component
Failure
1

2 or More
Categories
1

2
6

6

1

1

Hypothesis Testing
The first hypothesis tested was that there was no significant relationship between
space-system workmanship error and rocket launch outcome. Because the data were
ordinal, a Spearman’s rho correlation test was conducted. The test results showed
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statistical significance, rs (610) = .499, R2 = .249, p < .001. The null hypothesis was
rejected. There was a significant relationship between workmanship error and the launch
outcome.
The second hypothesis tested was that there was no significant relationship
between space-system design error and rocket launch outcome. Because the data were
ordinal, a Spearman’s rho correlation test was conducted. The test results showed
statistical significance, rs (610) = .527, R2 = .278, p < .001. The null hypothesis was
rejected. There was a significant relationship between design error and the launch
outcome.
The third hypothesis tested was that there was no significant relationship between
space-system process error and rocket launch outcome. Because the data were ordinal, a
Spearman’s rho correlation test was conducted. The test results showed statistical
significance, rs (610) = .440, R2 = .193, p < .001. The null hypothesis was rejected.
There was a significant relationship between process error and the launch outcome.
The fourth hypothesis tested was that there was no significant relationship
between space-system component failure and rocket launch outcome. Because the data
were ordinal, a Spearman’s rho correlation test was conducted. The test results showed
statistical significance, rs (610) = .527, R2 = .278, p < .001. The null hypothesis was
rejected. There was a significant relationship between component failure and the launch
outcome.
Qualitative Data
Due to the limited number of survey participants, no qualitative data was
analyzed. The responses from the two participant companies indicated that both
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companies utilized standardized maintenance procedures. Neither participant company
required their engineers or maintainers to have either an A&P or a SpaceTEC®
certification. Both companies also indicated that they believed that it was not necessary
for the FAA to establish any oversight in the production and/or maintenance of their
product. Both companies further believed that oversight should not occur even after their
product entered the operational stage of development.
The responses from the four non-participants indicated that their companies had
policies against participating in surveys or studies. The responses suggested two reasons
for those company policies: (a) security and (b) due to the intense competition in the race
to create a viable commercial space-system, proprietary information could not be
provided.
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Chapter V
Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations
Approximately 22 rocket launches occur in the United States every year. A
94.3% success rate sounds good, but a 5% failure rate equates to approximately one
failure per year. Almost all launch failures are catastrophic. Although costly, spacesystem operators can eventually recover from an unmanned launch failure, but when
there is a loss of life, a launch failure can never truly be recoverable.
Discussion
The overall launch success rate determined by this study was 94.3%. The success
rate had only improved slightly from the 93.5% success rate noted in Chang’s (1996)
study of launches from 1984 through 1994. Although an improvement was noted, the
improvement was very slight. Therefore, the space-system designers, manufacturers, and
organizations have yet to correct or resolve the problem areas. Several of the rocket
failures studied were carbon copies of previous failures indicating that the industry was
not using previous launch outcomes as input into future launches. The problem areas
evolved and changed over the time period covered in this report.
Causal factors. In Figure 1, the launch failures were categorized by causal
factor. Two notable features became apparent from the depiction. The first notable
feature was that component failures accounted for only 26% of the U.S. launch failures.
The remaining 74% of the U.S. launch failures were due to human error. Of the three
human error related causal factor classifications, workmanship error had the greatest
frequency of primary occurrences in U.S. rocket failures (29%), followed by design
errors (22.6%) then process errors (13%). The human errors that have occurred during
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the lifecycle of the rockets must be reduced. Identifying workmanship error as the most
frequent human error-related causal factor highlights the necessity for industry-wide
consensus standards.
Subsystem failures. Table 2 categorized the U.S. launch failures by the
subsystem that was the root cause of the failure. Table 2 confirmed what Chang (1996)
presented in his study; the propulsion subsystem was the weakest link in achieving a
successful launch with 12 failures and followed closely by separation with 10 failures.
Subsystem failures by causal factor. When the subsystem failures were
categorized by causal factor in Figure 2, two items of note stood out. First, in the
propulsion subsystem, which had the highest frequency of failures, workmanship error
was the primary causal factor of the failures. The second notable item was that the
separation subsystem had component failures as its primary causal factor. Workmanship
errors in the propulsion subsystem and component failure in the separation subsystem
were the two main causal factors for launch failures; therefore, the industry needed to
focus their program improvement efforts on providing the necessary consensus standards
for all stages of the production lifecycle from design and manufacturing through
operation.
Subsystem failures by period. Figure 3 depicted the subsystem failures broken
down into three time periods. The first period covered the span of Chang’s (1996) study
and supported his findings that the propulsion subsystem was the weakest subsystem.
The data indicated that beginning in 1994, the problems with the propulsion subsystem
were being resolved and the propulsion subsystem was becoming more reliable. Figure 3
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also indicated that beginning in 1994, the separation subsystem had become the leading
causal factor in rocket launch failures.
Launches by organization. Tables 3 through 5 depicted the U.S. launches
categorized by organization. NASA had the highest success rate among the launch
organization categories of NASA, U.S. Air Force, and all other non-DOD launch
organizations. NASA’s success may be attributable to their experience in launching
rockets. NASA has been launching rockets since 1950 and the agency has learned many
lessons throughout that time. One of NASA’s lessons learned was found in the rigorous
standards imposed on all contractors/subcontractors throughout the rocket’s lifecycle
from design through operation. Most of the non-DOD organizations had just begun
launching rockets and were still in the early stages of production, which could account
for their higher failure rate. In addition, the non-DOD organizations had not imposed or
implemented the rigorous standards that NASA and the DOD had established.
Another notable item shown in Tables 3 through 5 was that NASA had zero
failures due to workmanship error. Several reasons could be suggested to account for
their success. The success may be due to funding, which allows the NASA
contractors/subcontractors to employ more people and to have more time to complete
maintenance cycles. NASA also held very strict maintenance procedures, which could
account for their success.
Statistical significance. The results of the hypotheses testing showed that each
of the four independent variables (workmanship error, design error, process error, and
component failure) had a statistically significant relationship with U.S. rocket launches’
outcome. The results made sense in that as the occurrences of the independent variables
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increased, the number of rocket failures also increased. When the percent of variance
accounted for by the relationship of the causal factors with the launch outcome were
added together, 100% of the variance was accounted for. Therefore, design errors
accounted for 27.8% of the variance with the launch outcome, component failures
accounted for 27.8% of the variance with the launch outcome, workmanship errors
accounted for 24.9% of the variance with the launch outcome, and process errors
accounted for 19.3% of the variance with the launch outcome.
Conclusions
The development of aircraft from the first airplane into a commercial airliner
necessitated that the aircraft designers, manufacturers, and operators learn from their
successes and failures. The lessons learned were always costly and sometimes included
the loss of life. The U.S. DOT cannot afford to make those same mistakes with
commercial space transportation, especially when the historical data indicates a 5.7%
launch failure rate. As the industry moves into the commercial space age with
passengers, these failures could include the loss of many lives. Advances in technology
and lessons learned from previous space launch failures have only slightly increased the
success rates over the last 20 years. Unfortunately, the same mistakes reoccur; therefore,
the industry must make changes to minimize or prevent launch failures from happening.
Causal factors. Only 26% of the total number of failures were attributed to
component failures. The remaining 74% of the total number of failures were attributed to
human error in the forms of workmanship error, process error, and/or design error. Of
the three forms of human error, workmanship error had the highest frequency of
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occurrence (29%), while design errors accounted for the highest variance with the launch
outcome (27.8%).
Human error. Design error accounted for 27.8% of the variance with the launch
outcome, workmanship error accounted for 24.9% of the variance with the launch
outcome and process error accounted for 19.3% of the variance with the launch outcome.
The human error element of failure can be mitigated. Varma (1996) showed that the rate
at which human error occurred in technical tasks was greatly reduced through the use of
standardized maintenance practices, standardized technician training (both initial and
follow-on), and certification of individuals to inspect the maintenance performed.
Subsystems. The results of this study found that the propulsion subsystem had
the highest frequency of failures recorded during the 28 years covered. Although the
propulsion subsystem had the most failures, the failure rate of the propulsion subsystem
had improved in recent years. The manufacturers and launch operators appeared to have
used the historical data to improve the reliability of the propulsion subsystem
dramatically. Currently, the opportunity must be taken to further increase space system
reliability by reducing the propulsion error rate to less than 1%.
Since 1994, the separation subsystem had become the subsystem with the highest
frequency of failure. The data indicated that component failure had the highest frequency
of occurrence within the separation subsystem. Most of the component failures were due
to the extreme conditions present in a space environment. Therefore, the design of the
individual components must account more fully for the extreme conditions in order to
reduce the launch failures.
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Launch organizations. The results found that NASA had developed the
appropriate combination of standards for procedures, processes, technician training, and
certifications that were necessary to minimize failure rates. Specifically, the results
showed that NASA did not have any failures of rocket launches that were due to
workmanship error.
Recommendations
The following recommendations stem from the concept that commercial aviation
and commercial space travel are very similar and that many parallels can be drawn
between the two. The lessons learned in the world of commercial aviation were learned
the hard way, and many corrective actions have been established. The commercial space
industry can learn from commercial aviation and make the necessary changes without
having to relearn those same lessons.
The differences between commercial aviation and commercial space travel are
that a space vehicle must withstand much greater forces, withstand greater variances in
environmental conditions, and utilize different materials for construction and operation.
Throughout the life cycle, the same management principals are applicable in both cases.
Arguably, a commercial space vehicle is completely different from a commercial
airplane, but very strong similarities can be made. A commercial space vehicle transports
passengers in a mechanical structure that launches, flies, and lands. Beyond the
capabilities of an aircraft, a commercial space vehicle has the capability to reach higher
altitudes, leave the confines of earth’s atmosphere, and travel in space. The requirements
for maintaining such a precise system should have, at a minimum, the same requirements
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that are required for commercial aviation. These recommendations are not an allinclusive list but a starting point for the industry as a whole.
Commercial space industry. Everyone involved in the space industry must
embrace a safety culture. The ultimate goal is to safely launch and recover space
vehicles. Initially, establishing new safety procedures is costly; but, when the new costs
are measured against the costs resulting from a failure, it is much more cost effective to
make the investment in a positive safety culture and prevent the failure altogether.
In an article presented at the 36th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion
Conference and Exhibit, Owens (2000) discussed whether oversight or insight was more
important in reducing rocket launch failures. Owens identified several of the same issues
found by this study and recommended that the space industry adopt a “school house”
(p. 11) approach to improve safety and reduce failures.
Owens’ (2000) idea of the schoolhouse approach requires everyone involved to
embrace the concept that the space launch industry needs both insight and oversight to
ensure safe operations. Insight builds on the premise that the developers, contractors,
maintainers, operators, and all who are involved in commercial space industry know what
they are doing and will do everything possible to produce a top quality product.
Oversight builds on the premise that quality control is ensured through continuous test
evaluations, observations, and inspections.
Organizations. When organizations build, operate, and/or maintain spacesystems, they equate safety to additional costs. Safety costs can stem from additional
time required to perform and sign-off maintenance tasks; additional salaries and benefits
for people to perform the functions of inspection, oversight, recording, and filing; and
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additional costs involved with the training and certification of employees, hiring
employees with higher education and/or certification levels, and performing follow-on
training. Those additional costs are minimal when compared to the cost of the space
vehicle, the cost of cleanup, and the cost of lives associated with a launch failure.
Because safety is a cornerstone to launch success, space-system organizations
must work together to develop an industry-wide safety culture. The schoolhouse insight
approach should be adapted, including a cooperative agreement to share lessons learned
among all organizations involved. Although the industry needs to maintain some level of
secrecy due of the proprietary nature of equipment, the type and quantity of information
shared can be varied, which will allow the lesson to be shared without divulging secrets.
Therefore, once the rocket becomes operational on a commercial level, it is imperative
that all space industry organizations share every safety related lesson learned with the rest
of the industry.
NASA has set a very high standard that is worth following. NASA’s success
rates and lack of workmanship error establish NASA as a safety leader from which all
other space industry organizations can benefit. Organizational management should
mirror NASA strategies, policies, and procedures in an effort to limit failures.
Space-system organizations should require formal initial training and certification
of the technicians who will be performing maintenance on commercially operational
space-systems. Space-system organizations should also utilize follow-on training on a
cyclical basis to maintain the currency of the technicians with industry changes.
Space-system organizations should develop and utilize standard maintenance
procedures for each maintenance task to be performed. The procedures should include
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steps that require a sign-off by the technician performing the work. Additionally, there
should be a requirement for all maintenance tasks to be inspected and signed-off by a
certified inspector. Maintenance tasks should be evaluated and assigned a risk level. The
most experienced inspectors should inspect items that have a higher possibility of causing
catastrophic failure.
FAA. Currently the FAA only recommends that space-system organizations
should utilize standardized maintenance procedures, require standardized training, and
require SpaceTEC® certification of maintenance technicians (Federal Aviation
Administration, 2005). The following recommendations are provided to enhance
oversight of U.S. space-systems.
The Office of Commercial Space Transportation should establish space-system
maintenance requirements similar to the regulations for commercial aviation. The
regulations should specify the minimum sign-off and inspection requirements for
maintenance tasks on commercial space-systems. The requirements should target
systems that have entered the operational stage of development and should make
allowances for experimental space vehicles.
The Office of Commercial Space Transportation should either (a) develop and
require their own testing and certification of space-system maintainers, such as a
Spacecraft and Propulsion (S&P) certification, or (b) fully require SpaceTEC®
certification of space-system maintainers. The Office of Commercial Space
Transportation should standardize the prerequisite minimum qualifications for
technicians to apply for and receive certification to maintain space-systems that transport
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commercial passengers. In addition, the Office of Commercial Space Transportation
should standardize the specific requirements for certification of inspectors.
The current recommendation by the FAA is to utilize SpaceTEC® as a certifying
agency. The author believes that the SpaceTEC® program meets the needs of the
industry; however, the author believes that the prerequisites are vague, and they should
be better defined. If the intent of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation is to
require certification of maintainers and inspectors through SpaceTEC®, then oversight of
the certification program should occur. The oversight should include a review of the
prerequisites; a review of program policies, procedures, and certification; and the
approval of the program with requirements for follow-on inspections. SpaceTEC®
should be required to report all certifications of maintainers and inspectors to the Office
of Commercial Space Transportation for recordkeeping and management. The Office of
Commercial Space Transportation should retain the final authority to approve,
disapprove, or revoke all space-system maintenance certificates.
The Office of Commercial Space Transportation should establish the
requirements for standardized initial training at technical schools. Those requirements
should be, at a minimum, equivalent to the requirements for institutions certifying
aviation technicians taking the A&P examinations under 14 CFR Part 147 (Federal
Aviation Administration Aviation Maintenance Technician Schools, 1962).
Colleges and institutions. The space-system maintenance technician
manufactures, assembles, service tests, troubleshoots, operates, and repairs systems. The
space-system maintenance technician can be associated with space launch vehicles,
platforms, payloads, related laboratories, and ground support equipment.
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Colleges and institutions should create space-systems maintenance programs that
meet FAA requirements, meet the Office of Commercial Space Transportation
requirements, and align with the current developments in the space industry. According
to the current recommendations of the FAA, those courses of instruction should lead to a
SpaceTEC® Certification.
Course of instruction. The following courses of instruction have been developed
as a guideline for colleges and institutions, as they develop their programs. The author
recommends that the spirit of these course curricula be captured in the development of
each institution’s programs.
The Associate of Science in Aerospace Technology (ASAT) is composed of 60
credits hours (see Appendix C1). The Bachelor of Science in Aerospace Technology
(BSAT) is composed of 121 credit hours (see Appendix C2). Both programs are intended
to prepare students for entry-level positions in the space-systems maintenance industry
and to provide the prerequisite knowledge and skills necessary to attain certification
through SpaceTEC®. The course descriptions for the space-system maintenance specific
courses are described in Appendix C3.
Future studies. An in-depth study of NASA, U.S. Air Force, and non-DOD
organizations should be funded to examine where the similarities and differences are in
their requirements for space-system maintenance safety procedures, Space-system
technician training and space-system technician certification. The best requirements
should be identified and brought forward for consensus of industry members.
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A study to analyze the system failures in more detail, including the type of
propulsion (solid fuel or liquid fuel) that was used in each rocket failure, should be
initiated. The details of the system failures should be shared with the industry.
Lastly, a trend analysis of the component failures, in as much detail as possible,
should be initiated. The trend analysis should identify which components have the
highest failure rates and propose solutions to correct the deficiencies.
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Permission to Conduct Research
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Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Application for IRB Approval
Determination Form
12-122

Principle Investigator: Student Daniel Schultz under advisement of Dr. MaryJo Smith

Project Title: Analyzing Space-systems Engineer/Technician Structure and Training

Requirements

Submission Date: March 1, 2012

Determination Date: March 9, 2012

Review Board Use Only
Initial Reviewer: Teri Vigneau/Bert Boquet
Exempt: X Yes

___ No

Approved: X Yes ___ No
Comments: The purpose of this survey is to analyze the current and future structure of Spacesystem manufacturers and operators in regards to utilization of engineers and /or technicians to
perform assembly maintenance, and / or repair of space components, systems, and /or vehicles.
This will be done through the use of survey monkey. As this is a survey it poses no risks to
participants and may be considered exempt. [Teri Vigneau 3-5-12]
This protocol is exempt. [Bert Boquet 3-14-12]
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Data Collection Device
B1

U.S. Launch Failures

B2

Questionnaire

Appendix B1
U.S. Launch Failures 1984-2011
Workmanship

CF

Design

0

0

1

19850828 USAF

D-7

Titan 34D

Heavy

ELV

Propulsion

1

0

0

1

19860128 NASA

51-L

STS-Challenger

Heavy

RLV Propulsion

2

0

1

0

19860418
19860503
19870326
19880902
19900314

D-9
178
AC-67
D-3
CT-2

Titan 34D
Delta
Atlas-Centaur
Titan 34D
Titan III

Heavy
Small
Medium
Heavy
Heavy

ELV
ELV
ELV
ELV
ELV

Propulsion
Electrical
Other
Propulsion
Separation

0
0
2
0
0

2
0
0
2
2

0
2
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

19910418 Other AC-70

Atlas-Centaur

Intermediate ELV

Propulsion

0

2

0

0

19910717 Other F-2

Pegasus

Small

ELV

Separation

0

0

0

2

19920822 Other AC-71

Atlas-Centaur

Intermediate ELV

Propulsion

0

2

0

0

19930325 Other AC-74

Atlas-Centaur

Intermediate ELV

Propulsion

0

2

0

0

19930802 USAF K-11
19940627 Other STEP-1

Titan 403A
Pegasus XL

Heavy
Small

ELV
ELV

Propulsion
Avionics

1
0

0
0

0
0

1
2

19950622 Other F9

Pegasus XL

Small

ELV

Separation

0

2

0

0

Flight

USAF
NASA
USAF
USAF
Other

1

2

1

2

1

2

1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
13
9

1

3

1

2

1

3

1

3

1
1

2
2

2

7

Reference 3

Process
1

Reference 2

Subsystem
Propulsion

Reference 1

Type
ELV

Size
Medium

Model
Atlas

Organization

AC-62

Launch Date

19840609 NASA

Short Description
Fuel line leaking in Centaur
reaction control system
Stage I engine propellant leakage
and premature shutdown
Hot gas leaked through O-ring in
the SRM joint
Motor case burn through
Stage I relay box electrical short
Thunderstorm
Transtage fuel-tank leak
Second stage failed to separate
because of incorrect interface
wiring
Centaur engine failed to achieve
full thrust
Stage and payload separation
anomalies
Centaur engine failed to achieve
full thrust
Power loss and premature
shutdown of first stage engine
Motor case burn through
Autopilot software used erroneous
aerodynamic load coefficient
Incorrect assembly of the
interstage ring
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U.S. Launch Failures 1984-2011

CF

Design

19951023 Other F1

Conestoga

Small

ELV

Avionics

0

0

0

2

19961104 Other F14

Pegasus XL

Small

ELV

Separation

0

0

2

0

19970117 Other D241

Delta II

Medium

ELV

Propulsion

0

2

0

0

19980812 USAF

Titan 401A

Heavy

ELV

Electrical

0

2

0

0

19980827 Other D259

Delta III

Intermediate ELV

Avionics

0

0

0

2

19990409 USAF

Titan 402B

Heavy

ELV

Separation

2

0

0

0

19990427 Other LM005 Athena-2

Small

ELV

Separation

0

0

2

0

19990430 USAF

Heavy

ELV

Avionics

2

0

0

0

A20

B27

B32

Titan 401B

2

8

2

11

2

9

2

7

2

14

2

9

2

9

2

15

2

9
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Workmanship

1

Reference 3

Process

1

Reference 2

Subsystem

0

Reference 1

Type

0

Size

Other

Model

ELV

Flight

Small

Organization

Athena

Launch Date

19950815 Other DLV

Short Description
Vented hydraulic fluid damaged a
nozzle feedback cable resulting in
loss of directional control
Faulty attitude data inputs caused
an excess number of directional
changes resulting in the depletion
of hydraulic fluid and loss of
directional control
A failed battery prevented the
pyrotechnic system from firing at
seperation
Solid booster ruptured in-flight due
to damage during ground handling
A wiring harness damaged prior to
launch caused an intermittent
power signal to the guidance
system
Overcompensation to oscilations
caused the loss of hydraulic fluid
for steering
1st and 2nd stage failed to
separate completely due to aa
electrical connector plug being
wrapped and taped
Fairing failed to separate due to
operational ordnance failure
An incorrect value entered into the

U.S. Launch Failures 1984-2011

CF

Design

Taurus

Medium

ELV

Separation

0

0

2

0

20060324 Other F1-1

Falcon 1

Small

ELV

Propulsion

0

0

2

0

20070321 Other F1-2

Falcon 1

Small

ELV

Other

0

0

0

2

20080803 Other F1-3

Falcon 1

Small

ELV

Separation

0

0

0

2

20090224 Other T8

Taurus XL

Small

ELV

Separation

0

0

2

0

20110304 Other T9

Taurus XL

Small

ELV

Separation

0

0

2

0

2

12

2

8

4

5

5

7

5

6

2

7

2

9

Reference 3

Workmanship

20010921 Other T6

Reference 2

Process

0

Reference 1

Subsystem

2

Type

0

Size

0

Model

Propulsion

Flight

Intermediate ELV

Organization

Delta III

Launch Date

19990505 Other D269

Short Description
flight software caused the rocket to
perform incorrectly
Combustion chamber rupture
caused by a change in
manufacturing procedures which
resulted in pockets of air in the
metal
One of the nozzle gimbal actuator
drive shaft seized for about 5
seconds which cause the loss of
directional control
Failure of an aluminum B-nut on
the fuel pump cause a fuel leak and
subsequent fire
LOX sloshing was caused when
contact was made between the
2nd stages and the interstage at
separation
The timing of the separation
allowed the first stage to recontact
the second stage which caused a
loss of directional control
A faulty pressure initiator caused
the fairing not to separate
Fairing failed to separate
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Appendix B2

Questionnaire
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Dear Participant,
Please complete the following questionnaire. The accuracy of your answers is very important to the study results. Please check or fill
in the appropriate answer. If a question does not pertain to you, please leave the question blank. Thank you for participating in this
research.

1. I acknowledge that I have read and fully understand the consent form. I sign it freely and
voluntarily. By selecting Yes, I consent to participating in the research project entitled: Analyzing
Space-systems Engineer/Technician Structure and Training Requirements.
Yes
No

2. What field/s is/are your company in?
Space-system Component Manufacturer
Space-system Developer
Space-system Operator
Spacecraft Operator
Please provide the name of your company in the space below
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3. Please identify the top 5 space products that your company assembles, maintains, operates,
and/or repairs. Please label them 1 through 5.

4. What stage of production is your product/system in?
Stage of Development
Product 1
Product 2
Product 3
Product 4
Product 5

Other (please specify)

Dropdown menu reads:
Conceptual (Just on paper)
Advanced Development (Research)
Detailed Design (Engineering)
Production (Execution, Assembly, and
Experimental)
Termination (Final product)
Operational (Ready for commercial sale/use)
N/A
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5. What is the current approximate percentage of the employees (Engineers/Non-Engineer
Technicians) that assemble, repair, and/or maintain your product/system? (e.g., 30 / 70 means 30%
engineers and 70% non-engineer technicians)
Engineers / Non-engineer Technicians (Respectively)
Product 1
Product 2
Product 3
Product 4
Product 5

Other (please specify)

Dropdown menu reads:
0 / 100
10 / 90
20 / 80
30 / 70
40 / 60
50 / 50
60 / 40
70 / 30
80 / 20
90 / 10
100 / 0
N/A
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6. What are your current hiring requirements?
FAA Airframe & Powerplant
License

Degree

SpaceTEC® Certification

Engineer
Non-Engineer
Technician

Please list the minimum EXPERIENCE required by your company for engineers AND non-engineers to be
hired. You may also use this block for any additional requirements.
Degree dropdown menu reads:
None
Associates
Bachelors
Masters
Doctorate

FAA and SpaceTEC® dropdown menus read:
Required
Not Required

7. How often does your company require follow-on training?
Proficiency

Certification

Safety

Engineer
Non-Engineer
Technician

Other (please specify)
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Dropdown menus read:
None
Weekly
Monthly
Quarterly
Semi-annually
Annually
Bi-annually

8. How will the structure of the employees (Engineers / Non-Engineer Technicians) that assemble,
repair, and/or maintain your product change WHEN/IF your product begins to OPERATE
COMMERCIALLY?
Engineers / Non-engineer Technicians (Respectively)
Product 1
Product 2
Product 3
Product 4
Product 5

Other (please specify)
Dropdown menu reads:
0 / 100
10 / 90
20 / 80
30 / 70
40 / 60
50 / 50
60 / 40
70 / 30
80 / 20
90 / 10
100 / 0
N/A
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9. To what degree does your company utilize STANDARDIZED maintenance procedures?
No Standard Procedures

Standard Procedures
(Recommended Use)

Standard Procedures
(Required to Use)

a. To PERFORM
maintenance
b. To DOCUMENT the
maintenance
performed
c. To require the
ENGINEER/TECHNIC
IAN to SIGN-OFF
each maintenance
action performed
d. To require an
INSPECTOR to SIGNOFF ROUTINE
maintenance actions
e. To require an
INSPECTOR to SIGNOFF SAFETY OF
FLIGHT maintenance
actions

Other (please specify)
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10. To what degree do you believe there is a need for the FAA to mandate the below requirements?
Not Necessary

Engineers Only

Non-Engineers Only

Both Engineers &
Non-engineer
Technicians

a. STANDARD
MAINTENANCE
PROCEDURES:
Production Stage of
Lifecycle
b. STANDARD
MAINTENANCE
PROCEDURES:
Operational Stage of
Lifecycle
c. STANDARD TRAINING
REQUIREMENTS:
Production Stage of
Lifecycle
d. STANDARD TRAINING
REQUIREMENTS:
Operational Stage of
Lifecycle
e. MAINTAINER
CERTIFICATION:
Production Stage of
Lifecycle
f. MAINTAINER
CERTIFICATION:
Operational Stage of
Lifecycle

Other (please specify)
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Appendix C
Recommended Space-system Maintenance Degree Programs
C1

ASAT Degree Requirements

C2

BSAT Degree Requirements

C3

Space-system Maintenance Technology (SMT) Description of Courses
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Appendix C1
ASAT Degree Requirements
Communication Theory & Skills (6 CR)
 100 Level English Composition & Literature
 200 Level Speech
OR
 200 Level Technical Report Writing

3 CR
3 CR
3CR

Humanities (3 CR)
 100 Level Humanities

3 CR

Social Sciences (3 CR)
 100 Level Introduction to Psychology

3 CR

Computer Science (3 CR)
 100 Level Microcomputer Applications in Aviation

3 CR

Mathematics (3 CR)
 100 Level College Mathematics for Aviation I

3 CR

Space-systems Maintenance Technical Courses (42 CR)
 100 Level Aerospace Fundamentals
3 CR
 100 Level Basic Electricity
3 CR
 100 Level Industrial and Aerospace Safety
3 CR
 100 Level Spacecraft Materials and Processes
3 CR
 200 Level Aerospace Electrical/Electronic Systems
3 CR
 200 Level Aerospace Structural Fabrication I
3 CR
 200 Level Aerospace Structural Fabrication II
3 CR
 200 Level Applied Aerospace Mechanics I
3 CR
 200 Level Applied Aerospace Mechanics II
3 CR
 200 Level Precision Measurements and Tests
3 CR
 300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace Life Support Systems 3 CR
 300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace Propulsion Systems 3 CR
 300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace-Systems
3 CR
 300 Level Maneuvering Propellants
3 CR
Total credits

60 CR
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Appendix C2
BSAT Degree Requirements
Communication Theory & Skills (9 CR)
 100 Level English Composition & Literature
 200 Level Speech
 200 Level Technical Report Writing

3 CR
3 CR
3 CR

Social Science Lower Level (3 CR)
 100 Level Introduction to Psychology

3 CR

Humanities Lower Level (3 CR)
 100 Level Humanities

3 CR

Social Sciences – Upper Level (3 CR)
 300 Level Human Factors I: Principles and Fundamentals 3 CR
Computer Science (3 CR)
 100 Level Microcomputer Applications in Aviation

3 CR

Mathematics (6 CR)
 100 Level College Mathematics for Aviation I
 100 Level College Mathematics for Aviation II

3 CR
3 CR

Physical & Life Science (7 CR)
 100 Level Technical Physics I
 100 Level Technical Physics II
 100 Level Technical Physics Lab

3 CR
3 CR
1 CR

Common Core Curriculum (3 CR)
 200 Level Principles of Management

3 CR

Space-system Maintenance Technical Courses (42 CR)
 100 Level Aerospace Fundamentals
3 CR
 100 Level Basic Electricity
3 CR
 100 Level Industrial and Aerospace Safety
3 CR
 100 Level Spacecraft Materials and Processes
3 CR
 200 Level Aerospace Electrical/Electronic Systems
3 CR
 200 Level Aerospace Structural Fabrication I
3 CR
 200 Level Aerospace Structural Fabrication II
3 CR
 200 Level Applied Aerospace Mechanics I
3 CR
 200 Level Applied Aerospace Mechanics II
3 CR
 200 Level Precision Measurements and Tests
3 CR
 300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace Life Support Systems 3 CR
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300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace Propulsion Systems 3 CR
300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace-Systems
3 CR
300 Level Maneuvering Propellants
3 CR

Space transportation Area of Concentration (42 CR)
 100 Level Introduction to Computing for Engineers
 200 Level Applied Climatology
 200 Level Planetary and Space Exploration
 200 Level Space Transportation System
 200 Level Survey of Meteorology
 200 Level Weather Information Systems
 300 Level Ergonomics and Bioengineering
 300 Level Human Factors in Space
 300 Level Planetary Atmospheres
 300 Level Satellite and Spacecraft Systems
 300 Level Thermodynamics of the Atmosphere
 400 Level Aerospace Physiology
 400 Level Human Factors Engineering
 400 Level Introduction to Space Navigation

3 CR
3 CR
3 CR
3 CR
3 CR
3 CR
3 CR
3 CR
3 CR
3 CR
3 CR
3 CR
3 CR
3 CR

Total credits

121 CR
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Appendix C3
Space-system Maintenance Technology
Description of Courses
100 Level Aerospace Fundamentals 3 CR
This course covers aerospace industry terminology and acronyms as well as hands-on
activities related to tools, procedures, and standard practices on space launch platforms
and vehicles. It provides an emphasis on inspection procedures, workplace rules and
regulations, safety procedures, good housekeeping practices and lessons learned.
100 Level Basic Electricity 3 CR
A comprehensive introduction using a broad based approach covering principles upon
which modern electronic/electrical systems operate. Introduction to basics of electronics,
measuring devices, basic units, resistance, conductors, measurement, sources,
series/parallel circuits, common DC/AC circuits, and safety will be covered.
100 Level Industrial and Aerospace Safety 3 CR
This course focuses on the theories and principles of occupational safety and health in a
practical and useful real world job-related setting. The major topics include Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) compliance, safety standards, code
enforcement, ergonomic hazards, mechanical hazards, falling, lifting, electrical hazards,
fire hazards, industrial hygiene, radiation, noise, emergencies, and environmental safety.
This course also covers identification of hazards; personal protective equipment; safe
practices; and protection of personnel, property, and equipment in the aerospace
environment. Safety procedures, including OSHA regulations and hazardous materials
handling, are also covered. Basic principles of quality assurance engineering relating to
work processes will be discussed.
100 Level Spacecraft Materials and Processes 3 CR
This course covers the physical properties and characteristics of common materials and
commodities used in the aerospace industry. Materials compatibility, basic metallurgy,
and treatment processes are also covered. Additionally, this course provides information
on aerospace applications of non-metallic materials. The use and inspection of adhesives,
coatings, sealants, and issues with delaminations, and faulty bonds are covered. The
effects of spacecraft fuels and oxidizers, including cryogenics and hypergolics, are also
included.
200 Level Aerospace Electrical/Electronic Systems 3 CR
A review of the operation of standard laboratory test equipment, the measurement of
electrical parameters, and an introduction to computer controlled instrumentation
systems. Major topics are: general instrumentation, transducers and signal conditioning,
electromechanical devices, servo controls, General Purpose Interface Bus (GPIB)
overview, and GPIB software and hardware. This course applies a hands-on learning
approach to the soldering, wire wrapping, potting, crimping and cable lacing of electronic
components. Printed circuit construction and repair are covered, as well as cable
installation and troubleshooting. This course also covers the basics of fiber optics and the
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fabrication of fiber optic cable assemblies, using a variety of connectors and splicing
techniques.
200 Level Aerospace Structural Fabrication I 3 CR
This course provides an introduction to basic machining and fabrication skills, including
mathematical computations and measurements as they apply to metal structures,
fabrication, and repair.
200 Level Aerospace Structural Fabrication II 3 CR
This course introduces the student to advanced core materials that are used in composites
manufacturing. It focuses on the inspection and repair theory, including damage
detection and repair instructions. It provides the knowledge and techniques, for the
student to refine and enhance his or her skills on projects using composite materials.
200 Level Applied Aerospace Mechanics I 3 CR
This course applies a hands-on approach to the identification, uses, and care of tools and
equipment used in aerospace-systems. Blueprint reading, geometric dimensioning, and
tolerancing for English and metric measuring systems are included.
200 Level Applied Aerospace Mechanics II 3 CR
This course provides an introduction to orbital mechanics or astrodynamics, as applicable
to ballistics and celestial mechanics, and the practical problems concerning the motion of
rockets and other spacecraft. This course also focuses on spacecraft trajectories, including
orbital maneuvers, orbit plane changes, and interplanetary transfers, and how mission
planners use aerospace mechanics to predict the results of propulsive maneuvers.
200 Level Precision Measurements and Tests 3 CR
This course covers electrical and mechanical testing procedures (primarily nondestructive testing), equipment, measurements, and instrumentation involved in
aerospace-systems. Verification of tool and equipment calibration is also covered. This
course provides information in aerospace applications of non-metallic materials.
300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace Life Support Systems 3 CR
This course provides an introduction to expendable and reusable spacecraft systems
including Environmental Control and Life Support Systems. The interaction of systems
with computerized data acquisition systems is also covered.
300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace Propulsion Systems 3 CR
This course introduces the student to the classification of propulsion systems, such as
chemical, electric, and nuclear propulsion, with a focus on the analysis and performance
of each system. Key features, performance characteristics, and maintenance techniques of
existing and planned (near future) propulsion systems for use on spacecraft are
summarized.
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300 Level Maintenance of Aerospace-Systems 3 CR
This course provides an introduction to expendable and reusable spacecraft systems
including hydraulic, pneumatic, electrical, propulsion, mechanical, and HVAC. It
focuses on techniques used in repair and troubleshooting of these systems.
300 Level Maneuvering Propellants 3 CR
This course includes a familiarization of fluid system components, their characteristics,
and applications. Storable propellants, such as cryogenic and hypergolic materials and
high-pressure systems, are also covered.

